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From shouting to counting: civil society
and good governance reform in
Cambodia
David J. Norman
Abstract This article explores the emergence of new spaces for civil society
organisations (CSOs) as a result of an increasing interest by international donors in
multi-stakeholder approaches to good governance under the ‘new policy agenda’.
Drawing upon a contemporary case study of civil society in Cambodia, it argues
that CSOs have been encouraged to perform two key roles on a national level:
professional service delivery agents and democratic watchdogs. Both roles are seen
by donors as integral to supporting an accountable and professional model of the
Cambodian state while drawing upon valuable private sector lessons in a synergetic
model of governance. The result is the construction of particular neoliberal spaces
for CSOs operating as technical implementation mechanisms in response to
externally driven donor pressures. Furthermore, under this new framework of
governance, CSOs face pressure to undergo internal transformation akin to new
public management reform; embracing economistic and administrative modes of
coordination as core values of civil society participation.
Key words: Cambodia; good governance; international development; civil society;
neoliberalism.
The elevation of civil society from the margins to the mainstream of inter-
national development orthodoxy over the last few decades, has coincided
with a broader critical discussion amongst an increasing number of civil
society organisations (CSOs) concerned about being incorporated into a
development paradigm seen as antithetical to their interests. CSOs had
previously championed issues such as participation, empowerment and
democracy in critique of what they perceived as an exclusionary neolib-
eral development project increasingly dislocated from local voices. In
response, orthodox developmental policy shifted towards a broader stake-
holder approach increasing the spheres of influence for CSOs, while
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invoking the same language of participation, empowerment and democ-
racy as integral to development strategies. In what became known as the
‘new policy agenda’, international donors prioritised the three pillars of
democracy, human rights and good governance as key conditionalities for
aid, while drawing upon the extensive experience of CSOs to help imple-
ment their reform projects. Promoting a model of synergism between the
state, market and civil society, contemporary discourse has, however, con-
verged around a set of ideals that is increasingly being described as a per-
verse confluence (Dagnino 2007) by sceptics; the co-option of civil society
under a broader neoliberal umbrella that utilises the same language of
pluralised participatory democracy, while re-inscribing development
orthodoxy (Cornwall and Brock 2005). Under the new policy agenda,
CSOs have become an integral cog in contemporary neoliberal donor
strategies tasked with streamlining the market into developing states.
Underpinning this agenda is a commitment to the reform of a developing
state’s economic and political architecture; economically through expand-
ing the role of CSOs as efficient service providers, and politically through
using CSOs to hold the state accountable as democratic watchdogs, under
an increasing commitment to a particular donor image of good
governance1 as the driving force of the new policy agenda (Edwards and
Hulme 1996a).
This article will draw upon a contemporary case study of Cambodia
where in the last two decades various donors have attempted to ‘re-build’
civil society in the wake of the appalling legacy of the Khmer Rouge, and
increasingly link CSOs to good governance reform as a key priority for the
reconstruction of the quasi-democratic Cambodian state.2 In particular it
will highlight how under this reform project a particular model of civil soci-
ety is being cultivated, linked to neoliberal modes of governance as a tech-
nical/managerial sphere tasked with streamlining market mechanisms into
an ideal type liberal democratic state. In this respect the article contributes
to a growing literature that has critically engaged with civil society’s co-
option under neoliberal frameworks more broadly (see Alvarez 1999;
Schild 2002; Townsend et al. 2002; Jad 2004; Kamat 2004) and the effects
of ‘hybridisation’; the interweaving of neoliberal norms into everyday
spaces (McCarthy 2005; England and Ward 2007).
Cambodian CSOs within this development ideal are encouraged to
embody the same logics that drive state and market actors; what Habermas
would label systemic logics of coordination.3 Central to these logics of coor-
dination is the notion of administrative power; a specific technical form of
rationality that is associated with efficiency and productivity, linked to
state power as a mode of steering that attempts to ‘assemble, distribute,
evaluate, and organise’ (Adorno 2001: 107). In order to trace these links,
the article will investigate the transformative key roles for CSOs that are
seen as central to the new policy agenda within the country; service
providers and democratic watchdogs, and highlight how through the driving
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force of good governance they are both encouraged to embody this particu-
lar neoliberal identity.
Good governance and the new policy agenda: mainstreaming
civil society
The origins of the good governance framework stem from the IMF and
World Bank’s reactions to failing Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs) in the late 1980s, where blame was placed squarely on authoritarian
and quasi-democratic governments for corrupt, inefficient and inflexible
bureaucracies distorting economic performance (IMF/World Bank 1989). In
1989 the Bank released its landmark report; Sub-Saharan Africa: From
Crisis to Sustainable Growth, implicitly invoking the need for a more demo-
cratic state that could successfully nurture private sector-led economic
growth (World Bank 1989). In the same year, the influential Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), began to recognise the existence of a ‘vital
connection between open, democratic and accountable political systems,
individual rights and the effective and equitable operation of economic sys-
tems’ (DAC 1997). With the ending of the Cold War, a new paradigm began
to emerge with the export of liberal democratic political systems and private
sector market principles to developing countries; focusing heavily on state
bureaucratic reform and good governance to ensure success (Robinson
1993; Edwards and Hulme 1996b; Crawford 2001)
In its early format, the good governance agenda, tended to focus heavily
on promoting an efficient, professional and accountable state public admin-
istration in an attempt to provide an enabling environment for private sec-
tor led growth (see Nelson and Eglinton 1992; Leftwich 1993). These
reforms emanated from the increasingly popular ideas of new public man-
agement; a form of public sector management synonymous with the idea of
an ‘entrepreneurial government’ that introduces a more private sector ori-
ented approach with its preference for quality, productivity, market-style
incentives and performance management (Lynn 2006). New public man-
agement as a managerial philosophy was exported as best practice; reforms
were implemented globally within public administrations throughout the
world (see Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Sarker 2009)
Throughout the 1990s, the good governance agenda began to evolve
from a narrow state-centric approach to development, towards a broader
multi-stakeholder approach led by the World Bank and its development
partners. These institutions began to acknowledge the importance of com-
munity involvement in development projects where wider participation
was now seen as ‘intrinsic to good governance’ (World Bank 1994: 42).
Public involvement in policy design and project implementation was con-
sidered paramount as it could ‘improve information flow, accountability,
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due process, and voice’ (World Bank 1994:43). This new participatory
approach still clearly retained a core emphasis on the need for an account-
able and professional public sector; however, there was a new focus on
forging closer partnerships with non-state actors, particularly from civil
society, in order to support bureaucratic reform (Lewis 2010).
A variety of bilateral and multilateral donors began to take a keen inter-
est in how civil society could actively support good governance reform, and
so began to focus on two key roles; professional service provision and dem-
ocratic oversight, both of which were seen as key to the overall success of
the new policy agenda to ‘enable choice, scrutinise errant governments,
and ultimately lead to regularised, plural democracy’ (Mohan 2002: 125;
Edwards and Hulme 1996c; Carothers and Ottaway 2000).
The first role describes the long established legacy of NGOs4 as supple-
mentary service providers in developing countries, however, under the
broadening of the good governance framework they have been elevated to
the forefront of service provision ‘in deliberate substitution for the state’
(Edwards and Hulme 1996c: 2). Structural adjustment and new public man-
agement reform of state bureaucracies led to a large-scale contracting out
of service provision including the decentralisation of welfare to the private
sector. NGOs that already held vast experience in small- scale service pro-
vision were regarded by donors as an important funding antidote to state
based welfare; the consequence of which was a rapid increase in their num-
bers as they became incorporated within this decentralised welfare system
as a short- term ‘magic bullet’ (Vivian 1994). The World Bank in particular,
regarded NGOs as cheap, effective and more viable alternatives to the
overly bureaucratic public sector, reaching the most vulnerable and inac-
cessible groups of beneficiaries more effectively than government counter-
parts (World Bank 1990).
The increase in funding and spaces available for NGOs created a devel-
opment marketplace within the service provision industry and resulted in
an increased effort on the behalf of donors to improve the efficiency and
structures of NGOs to ensure that they could fulfil these roles in the
absence of the state. Donors sought to make NGOs more ‘accountable’ as
a fundamental criterion within funding initiatives, through the infusing of
new public management strategies directly into their frameworks to create
a ‘professional’ form of NGO that could implement donor projects more
smoothly (Dichter 1999; Silliman 1999). Accountability within this context
has been narrowly interpreted to link closely with new public management
through accountancy, evaluation and audit procedures in an attempt to
ensure NGOs are responsible for the funds that are channelled through
them (Frumkin and Andre-Clark 2000; Dixon et al. 2006). As a conse-
quence a culture of audit appears, where NGO’s actively attempt to appear
‘fundable’ to their donors, often instilling projects that can be quantita-
tively measured, monitored and evaluated in order to have the best chan-
ces of demonstrating success (Guthman 2008).
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This shift towards a more accountable and professional NGO has
resulted in a form of decentralised neoliberalism reinforcing a particular
model of managerialism and economic rationality at the heart of these
organisations (Cooke 2004; Fyfe 2005). This can have the effect of creat-
ing an increasing gulf between this corporatist model of NGO that priori-
tises vertical conceptions of accountability through professional
performance audit mechanisms, and more informal organisations that
concentrate on accountability through community input (Dagnino 2007).
Ultimately, as a consequence of scaling up under a donor-based system
that ideologically reinforces neoliberal governance norms, the latter infor-
mal model of NGO is marginalised through a competitive market sector
that is more concerned with project output rather than community input
(Fowler 2000: 14).
The second role under the new policy agenda incorporates civil society
as a democratic oversight mechanism, in order to hold a developing state
accountable. NGOs are incorporated here alongside other forms of com-
munity based organisations (CBOs) into local governance frameworks in
order to tackle corruption and demand accountability from government
actors. The shift to a broader interpretation of good governance led the
DAC in 1993 to approve a working party on Participatory Development
and Good Governance (PDGG) drawing on two central tenets of this
broader approach: strengthening civil society to negotiate with government
bureaucracies to provide a check on government power, and the direct
involvement of communities to enhance more efficient and sustainable
development programmes (OECD 1995).
Demanding accountability of the state has become a core development
goal, where civil society is encouraged to strengthen ‘the demand for
reform, promoting and monitoring transparency and accountability in the
fight against corruption’ (DCD/DAC 2006). After the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness (2005) the DAC released a list of key principles to guide
donors as best practice in the fight against corruption, arguing that they
should coordinate: ‘. . .with local and international civil society and private
sector actors as the primary alternative, but recognising that strengthening
government commitment is the essential objective in the long term’ (DCD/
DAC 2006: 4).
Clearly the need to strengthen civil society is seen here not as an end
itself, but in the instrumental services of an anti-corruption agenda; inte-
gral to the donor perception of a liberal democratic state. The World Bank
calls this ‘Social Accountability’ and it involves organising CSOs into
frameworks designed to hold the state to account, while stimulating local
citizen demand for this accountability; integral to what the World Bank
describes as the demand side of good governance (Malena et al. 2005).
There are generally five areas that are targeted by donors as the func-
tional domains of social accountability: (1) budgets (2) public policy mak-
ing and planning, (3) public goods and services, (4) expenditures, (5)
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public oversight and monitoring (Sirker and Cosic 2007). In order to
improve accountability within these areas, various tools have been imple-
mented by CSOs for citizen and community participation including for
example, citizen report cards, community score cards, citizen ombudsmen
offices, citizens‘ oversight committees, participatory budgeting, social
audits, and participatory performance monitoring. In a similar vein to the
previous discussion on the permeation of neoliberal forms of governance
into service provision, social accountability tools can sometimes require
the construction of a specific technical/professional form of civil society
and can potentially lead to a prioritising of particular organisational prac-
tice. Increasingly popular citizen report cards and community score cards
are often modelled on private sector practice, involving performance moni-
toring of client satisfaction, including the quality, efficiency and adequacy
of public service provision. They can be seen as a surrogate for competition
for institutions that lack the same levels of responsiveness found within the
private sector when enterprises respond to a client’s needs, therefore they
offer a ’comparative and competitive dynamic similar to that imposed by
the market’ (Ackerman 2005: 14). In order for them to be successfully
implemented they are linked by donors with the more technical minded
NGOs that can serve as intermediaries between demanding citizens and
the accountable state (Ravindra 2004).
These Social Accountability tools first rely upon a specific type of CSO
to design and enforce the projects; the professional model, and second con-
struct spaces for citizens collectively working within informal groups, asso-
ciations and committees as a form of civil society that links advocacy to the
neutral and instrumental form of democratic participation. The World
Bank summarises this most succinctly with its 2004 report From Shouting
to Counting: A New Frontier in Social Development where: ‘It’s not just
about people protesting and making noise. This new approach to citizen
action actually involves systematic analysis and intelligent use of data,
making sure their governments spend effectively and keep their promises’
(World Bank 2004a).
These roles are designed to create the ideal model of a decentralised lib-
eral democracy that is responsive to the demands of its citizens. The shift
towards promoting democratic decentralisation contains a supply side
transformation of public administration including improving service deliv-
ery, and a demand side that places an emphasis upon civil society as a pres-
sure point to demand accountability from the state.
In order to highlight this increasing permeation of neoliberal forms of
governance under the New Policy Agenda, the article will now turn to an
analysis of international donor intervention in the country of Cambodia
since the early 1990s, where civil society has emerged as a powerful actor
in the country’s development. The permeation of neoliberal policies
through good governance frameworks, have created new spaces for civil
society in Cambodia, though these spaces of inclusion are deeply exclusive
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through the construction of a singular universal model of the professional,
competitive, and efficient CSO.
Cambodia encounters the new policy agenda: Donor harmonisation
and the good governance framework
Following the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords,5, the donor commu-
nity6 convened the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRC), leading in 1992 to the establish-
ment of the International Committee for the Rehabilitation of Cambodia
(ICORC). The arrival in 1992 of the United Nations Transitional Author-
ity in Cambodia (UNTAC) created a level of stability that had been absent
in the country for decades, and heralded an unprecedented increase in the
numbers of international NGOs arriving in the country.
Newly arriving International NGOs documented a nation-wide break-
down in societal trust, cooperation and communal bonds as a consequence
of the Khmer Rouge era (Barton 2001: 12). In response the donor commu-
nity began to heavily promote the emergence and growth of civil society;
perceiving the country as a ‘blank slate’7 and a unique opportunity to carry
out their various development projects (Hughes 2003: 138).
Although international donor governments had initially envisaged the
vast numbers of international NGOs arriving as a conduit for emergency
relief and aid, while keeping the unstable Cambodian state at arm’s length;
problems of corruption had manifested itself within the new political regime
(Curtis 1998: 74). In recognising these problems donors shifted away from
providing aid as emergency relief, towards the full ‘rehabilitation and the
development of the physical, social and political infrastructure of the
country’ (Grube 1998: 3). As a consequence, the international donor com-
munity established the Cambodian Consultative Group in 1996, to discuss
key development priorities and coordinate work with the Council for the
Development of Cambodia (CDC) and ensure donor priorities were carried
out by the state. Despite attempts to integrate a strong free market
economy within the country through structural adjustment, violence and
political instability in 1997 shifted donor priorities away from simple
macro-economic reform towards a stronger emphasis on ‘strengthening the
rule of governance, and tackling corruption’ (IMF 1999).
In 2004, the Cambodian Consultative Group released a statement
declaring the twin priorities of combating corruption and increasing
accountability as paramount for the development of the country. USAID
for example, established these priorities as primary goals alongside health
and education, arguing that the integration of good governance principles
were essential to ‘determine whether Cambodia succeeds or fails as a
country’ (USAID 2006: 1).
At the same time, the RGC released its critical 2004 Rectangular Strat-
egy, drawing upon key elements from the Millennium Development Goals,
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the Cambodia Socio-Economic Development Program 2001–2005
(SEDPII) and Cambodia’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003–
2005 (NRPS) to create a framework that officially places good governance
as the ‘cornerstone’ of Cambodia’s development (Hun 2004: 6). This theme
features prominently in the latest National Strategic Development Plan
2009–2013, and in the updated 2008 Rectangular Strategy (Phase II) where
good governance is seen as ‘the most important prerequisite to ensure
socio-economic development’ (RGC 2008b).
Cambodia’s bureaucratic system was decimated following the brutal
Khmer Rouge regime and as a result accountability practices have been
slow to take root. A World Bank report in 2004 detailed the need to encour-
age a new accountable structure that would transform bureaucratic service
provision; internal systems of audits, evaluations and monitoring mecha-
nisms that can act as a system of checks and balances to combat corruption
and poor service delivery (World Bank 2004b: 7). In order to implement
good governance reform, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) out-
lined the importance of public administration reform in order to make the
sector ‘neutral, transparent, professional, responsive and responsible’ (Hun
2004: 8). A broad package of administrative reforms was outlined to
strengthen the rule of law, enhance civil service management and impor-
tantly; establish good governance within service provision (RGC 2006).
Despite initiating a wealth of good governance reforms requested by the
donor community, the RGC in practice still tends to offer only lukewarm
support, and only championed when external international support has
been needed (Un and Hughes 2011:200). For example, the RGC since 2010
continues to delay the release of a draft budget law into the public domain,
as well as a long overdue ‘Access to Information Law’ despite pressure
from donors and international NGOs for full disclosure of public informa-
tion (NGO Forum 2012). An online 2006 national audit report was recently
withdrawn from public access further compounding donor frustrations at
this seemingly antithetical stance towards good governance.
As a result, donors are increasingly focusing on the second aspect of
accountability seen as integral to improving good governance; the need for
citizens, as a force within civil society, to monitor and hold to account the
RGC through the enhancement of social accountability.
These two elements of accountability are crucial to the framework of this
case study and link explicitly with the previous discussion of the role of civil
society under the new policy agenda. First, donors have emphasized the cru-
cial need for an accountable and efficient transformation of service
provision in the country; what is often neglected is that this service provision
is increasingly undertaken by NGOs who are now under pressure to incor-
porate new public management-style frameworks directly into their gover-
nance structures. Second, NGOs have been invoked as oversight monitors
tasked with constructing an enabling environment for citizens to exact
accountability from these service providers and the state more generally.
Both roles have created new spaces for civil society to expand influence and
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voice, however, the fulfilment of donor demands results in the formation of
a technical/professional neoliberal ideal-type with the potential to displace
and marginalize other civil society actors. This article will now discuss the
two different roles that are being undertaken within the country.
The new policy agenda: service provision and civil society in
Phnom Penh
The elevation of NGOs into the role of public service providers resulted in
a development marketplace where donors were faced with an immeasur-
able number of new NGOs forming and submitting funding requests, leav-
ing donors the opportunity to select preferred candidates dependent upon
set criteria. NGOs became effective sub-contractors to a new competitive
aid market while government counterpart organisations severely lacked
the skilled personnel to cope with the influx of funding and projects. This
resulted at first in the rise of a multitude of Come-and-go NGOs
(ComeN’GOs) that were specifically targeting donor funding for entrepre-
neurial motivations, often disbanding once projects had expired (Curtis
1998; Houm 1999).
In order to compete in a difficult funding market, NGOs have had to
adapt their internal structures in order to appear fundable and accountable.
Many began to establish standards of best practice in response to donors’
renewed interest in good governance reform, and although all are competing
for the rights to provide services, they have had to focus on ‘clearly defined
output expectations, tight monitoring and evaluation against key perfor-
mance indicators’ (Kimchoeun et al. 2007: 10). The government is currently
creating Special Operating Agencies (SOAs), which are sub-level ministries
that receive donor and state funding for contracting out service provision to
NGOs and the private sector (RGC 2008). These ministries will award Ser-
vice Delivery Grants (SDGs) and Management Contracts (MCs) to capable
NGOs that operate on the principles of good governance, transparency,
accountability and efficiency (World Bank 2008a).
NGOs are therefore attempting to develop and display proof to donors
of adaptation to increasingly professional good governance internal mech-
anisms, an example of which is a new project underway in Phnom Penh;
the NGO Governance and Professional Project (NGO-GPP)8 to create an
accreditation process that can help to single out those NGOs that display
an adherence to good governance principles.
In the last decade the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC)
argued that it was integral for NGOs to appear as accountable and trans-
parent as they could in order to have the best chance of attracting donor
money for their projects; not appearing to be interested in good gover-
nance would make it extremely difficult to operate in Cambodia (Interview
2007a). In 2004 it created the NGO-GPP with the intention of encouraging
and promoting NGO accountability and good organisational practice in
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the country. The first stage of the NGO-GPP project was to create a mini-
mum set of standards and ethical principles that would structure NGOs
into being more accountable and fundable to donors and included ensuring
that NGOs have a clearly defined mission statement, a commitment to
internal governance mechanisms that promote accountability and transpar-
ency, and a regular procedure for monitoring and evaluating staff and man-
agement. Interestingly the shift towards a more professional approach
includes, having an annual global financial audit, financial management
systems and annual performance appraisals (NGO-GPP 2007).
This has been reflected in an updated NGO-GPP programme that dem-
onstrates the shift towards a more professionalised approach that NGOs
should follow in order to be certified as practitioners of good governance
through increased self-regulation mechanisms. The NGO-GPP training
course offers daily topics on ‘organisational policies and board devel-
opment’, ‘effective human resource management’, ‘administrative and
financial management’, ‘monitoring and evaluation’ and ‘organisational
and strategic planning’ (CCC 2009). The NGO-GPP provides the newly
emerging professional NGO sector in Phnom Penh with a certificate that
signals to donors the suitability of an NGO for funding considerations.
There is new evidence emerging within the sector that key interna-
tional donors are starting to incorporate the NGO-GPP certification
within their funding preferences (CCC 2010) and that even the govern-
ment is starting to take notice of its importance to increased aid harmoni-
sation.9 This of course reflects the increasing trend globally for self-
regulatory systems as a method to attract donor funding. Donors are
showing clear preferences for ‘putting more emphasis on metrics to mea-
sure outcomes which require NGOs to improve knowledge management
and demonstrate accountability through subjecting themselves to bench-
marking against sector standards and codes of conduct’ (Lingan and
Hammer 2011: 5).
Many NGOs in Cambodia now hire business staff in order to understand
and facilitate the administrative demands required of them by donors.
Often smaller NGOs feel pressurised into establishing a board of directors,
management and financial committees as well as recruiting new personnel
specifically trained in private sector techniques to help carry out project
funding requests, audits and general administration (Interview 2007c).
Most NGOs have turned towards auditing as a standard method to remain
accountable and fundable; many in Phnom Penh are now externally audited
and must provide adequate financial disclosure and administrative reporting
as demanded by donors. Accountability embedded in new public manage-
ment (NPM) private sector notions of incentives and sanctions, results in
NGO managers having to reach certain performance requirements that
can be measured quantifiably (Kimchoeun et al. 2007: 10). It is not uncom-
mon to find an increasingly large number of NGOs linked to Western audit
firms such as Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), and intensifies the increas-
ingly material transformation of the sector to one focusing upon databases,
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accounts and programming; NGO staff are concerned that their creativity
is increasingly curtailed in the new climate (Henke 2007). For example, the
Cambodian Women’s Crisis Centre (CWCC) in Phnom Penh has over the
last decade undergone external training from consultants, and internal
organisational change to include a board of directors and a financial audit
committee. Some staff feel that they constantly face external pressures to
prioritise accountancy and audit mechanisms (and now ensure PwC con-
duct their external audit) or risk losing critical donor funding in an increas-
ingly competitive climate (Sok 2007). The link with global auditors allows
for powerful accountancy firms to expand their role in unparalleled ways,
including the selling of advice on deregulation, privatization and self-regu-
lation (Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen 2007: 36).
An interesting example to highlight the professionalisation of these
organisations comes from the expanding microfinance sector in the coun-
try, where a combination of donor pressure and government regulation has
resulted in the conversion of a majority of NGOs into professional microfi-
nance institutions (Norman 2011). Microfinance is a poverty reduction
strategy that provides small amounts of credit loans and other financial
services to the poor in order to provide people with the sufficient tools to
become financially autonomous and break the vicious cycle of poverty.
In Cambodia, as in many developing countries, this has become an
increasingly popular form of economic empowerment, linked to the gov-
ernment’s National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) strategy 2006–
2010 where the sector has ‘evolved from a series of small, isolated projects
into what is arguably the most sophisticated segment of the national finan-
cial services sector’ (Chou et al. 2008). In the mid-1990s, microfinance was
provided by a variety of NGOs; their local knowledge and high mobility
meant they were the ideal vehicle for supplying credit and various saving
schemes to local poor communities. In the last decade, however, the sector
has undergone a period of rapid commercialisation and expansion. This
has involved a shift in NGO funding sources from top-down donor grants
to market self-sustainability; significantly, it entails a professional private
sector approach to poverty reduction. As they move from the margins to
the centre of development assistance, Cambodian NGOs are rapidly
adjusting to a new commercial environment where they can successfully
upscale and expand their credit portfolios through internal organisational
restructuring to shift from NGO identities into newly created shareholder-
driven Microfinance Institutions (MFI). Initially, many of these NGOs
went through a corporate culture shock; staff were needed that understood
the business and financial side of customer service in order to prioritise
market expansion and improve organisational competitiveness. As a result,
the ten largest microfinance NGOs in the country have all become MFIs;
often creating new internal audit, credit, and financial management infor-
mation systems, human resource departments, and boards of directors in
order to expand financial activities and upscale their projects to meet
demand (Norman 2011).
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The commercialisation of microfinance in the country highlights the
complex links between civil society and the market; the pressures to mimic
a private sector approach to service provision tend to leave NGOs little
choice in the development marketplace. New public management inspired
reform can have the potential to create a civil society sector that is more
accountable, efficient, professional and fundable; reinscribing NGO identi-
ties through an instrumental neoliberal lens.
The new policy agenda: democratic oversight in Cambodia
The second element of the New Policy Agenda; civil society utilised as a
mechanism for democratic oversight, is also part of a powerful donor vision
of Cambodia. Political decentralisation has been implemented in Cambo-
dia since the establishment of commune councils in 2002, and more
recently with the establishment of provincial and district councils in 2009,
however, given the unique context of Cambodian civil society and a largely
politically uneducated rural population, there is often very little upwards
pressure to support these decentralisation efforts (Kim and Ojendal 2007:
4). In response, the construction of participatory spaces in development
projects to help educate and ‘stimulate demand’ have now become a core
development goal in Cambodia and a cornerstone of aid policy shortly
after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005.
Earlier models of fostering government accountability relied solely upon
supply-side effects of internal government mechanisms yet the new think-
ing involving civil society represents a shift towards creating demand-side
institutions, where NGOs and citizen participation are seen at the fore-
front; powerful tools of accountability (Kimchoeun et al. 2007: 28).
Social Accountability is a recent initiative to emerge from the World
Bank’s poverty reduction framework, considered integral to the World
Bank’s more inclusive approach to good governance and promoting citizen
empowerment. This initiative focuses primarily on a new method of hold-
ing public officials and public servants to account through developing
mechanisms that allow the direct participation of ordinary citizens as part
of a broader civil society context. This form of civil society differs from the
earlier donor understanding within the country, as an amalgamation of
professional NGOs providing services, towards a new monitory role as
described by the World Bank:
‘NGOs may also need to consider a change in their current roles and,
instead of substituting for weak service delivery, support efforts to
manage and monitor. . . performance and strengthen community-
level social accountability arrangements’
(World Bank 2008a: 34).
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The interpretation of civil society as a participatory oversight mechanism
was further strengthened under the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) to
encourage new roles for civil society in the oversight of development plan-
ning, budgetary processes and service provision, eventually implemented
within Cambodia under the country’s Harmonisation, Alignment and
Results (H-A-R) Action Plan where the RGC promised to ‘deepen our
engagement with civil society organisations’ (CDC 2010).
In 2006 the World Bank initiated the Demand for Good Governance
(DFGG) Project in Cambodia, arguably the first of its kind to focus exclu-
sively on developing community demand side approaches to tackle gover-
nance issues in the country, connecting both state and non-state
institutions (World Bank 2008b). The project is in response to what the
World Bank deems low standards of governance and endemic corruption
as the primary obstacles to achieving higher levels of economic and social
development in the country.
Four core elements of the World Bank’s DFGG project include, promot-
ing demand of accountability of the state (and including educating and dis-
seminating technical policy information to citizens), improving the
mediation of demand (such as strengthening feedback avenues and mecha-
nisms for closer interactions between citizens and officials), responding to
demand (strengthening service delivery), and monitoring to inform
demand (oversight of policy through social audits for example).
In 2007 the World Bank started work on a ‘Civil Society Assessment’ of
Cambodia in order to establish the possibilities and pitfalls of promoting
good governance through social accountability techniques, culminating in
the 2009 published Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil
Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia (World Bank 2009).
The report recognised that of the fundamental obstacles to the institu-
tionalisation of social accountability initiatives, lack of local participation
was key; projects tend to be formed by more Western orientated NGOs
schooled in the technical expertise of social accountability. Indeed the
Bank recognised that some of its proposals involve ‘a level of technical
expertise that even professional NGOs can find challenging’ (World Bank
2009: 28).
Within the report, there is an implicit recognition that social accountabil-
ity mechanisms are not historically situated or embedded in Khmer culture
thus they need to be ‘developed’ or ‘stimulated’ through capacity building
mechanisms among NGOs and various CBOs. In order to ensure that this
project will be smoothly implemented, the World Bank has chosen to enact
a capacity building project among CSOs through the development of a
complementary programme; the Program for Enhancing the Capacity for
Social Accountability (PECSA).
PECSA is an initiative launched by the World Bank and endorsed by the
Cambodian ministry of interior in response to the RGC’s 2004 rectangular
strategy, to support the DFGG project through enhancing the capacity for
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civil society to design and implement projects focusing on social account-
ability and good governance (PECSA 2010a). In order to stimulate demand
and enhance the capacity of civil society to undertake social accountability
initiatives, PECSA offers training and support to those organisations willing
to introduce and adapt global accountability mechanisms to the local Cam-
bodian context. The programme has run a variety of ‘Social Accountability
Schools’ in Cambodia involving an intense three week training programme
that is open to a variety of civil society organisations, from NGOs to media
professionals and run by the Silaka training agency. In Phnom Penh, there
are two key NGO training agencies that dominate the sector; Silaka and
Vicheasthan Bandosbondal NeakropkrongKangea (VBNK), both of which
have had a significant impact on establishing a more professional and flexi-
ble sector to attract donor funding. Silaka has trained over 5,000 individu-
als from INGOs and local NGOs in Cambodia in organisational practice
and capacity building, they have recently shifted the focus of their training
towards good governance techniques in order to create accountability and
transparency within NGOs. This includes undertaking workshops in bud-
getary monitoring, evaluation mechanisms, and administration skills.
VBNK is a similar organisation established to provide training and consul-
tation to other NGOs and assist in their capacity building, this includes
helping them develop multiple audit systems in line with external best
practices and conform to donor demands. In order for successful imple-
mentation, VBNK organise various training workshops on financial man-
agement, budget planning and monitoring, accounting systems and
professional development.
Teaching material provided by both Silaka and the World Bank for the
Social Accountability School demonstrates the attempt to build a technical
role for civil society in the monitoring and evaluating of service provision.
For example participants are taught about the key tools in the demand for
social accountability such as Citizen Report Cards (CRCs); these are inno-
vative for ‘blending the “science” of surveys with the “art” of advocacy/
reforms’ (Nair 2008). The scientific side of data collection and analysis of
service provision, is promoted as integral for implementing an efficient and
objective approach to democratic oversight. The CRC is a methodological
process where citizens can design and conduct surveys, analyse and inter-
pret the results, present the findings, and establish partnerships to pressure
service improvements. Indeed within this positivist framework can be
found a bias towards the more neutral ideal of ‘counting and discussing
instead of just shouting’ (Nair 2008). Social audits (of which the CRC is an
example), are important tools for the social accountability framework, the
teaching resources available from Silaka discuss how the shift from upwards
accountability in the traditional sense was aimed at checking and verifying
transactions of the state and its agencies, however, with the development of
the new public management paradigm, social auditing focuses upon down-
wards accountability to citizens through ‘compliance, quality management
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and efficiency’ (Silaka 2008). This external training offered is comple-
mented by the provision of grants from PECSA for CSOs undertaking
Social Accountability related projects, including a new scheme launched to
create a development marketplace mechanism to adjudicate between
potential beneficiaries of the available sources of funding (PECSA 2010b).
One CBO, the Phnom Srey Association for Development (PSAD) has
recently undertaken Silaka training on social accountability; resulting in
the construction of new advocacy tools centred on social audits (tracking
commune investment funds) and Citizen Rating Reports. To enhance their
funding prospects for grants on good governance initiatives they have
recently hired external consultants and advisers to help negotiate funding
from the World Bank (Mot 2012). Similarly, the Community Support
Organisation and Development (CSOD) have also recently adopted a new
professional strategy for advocacy after undertaking Silaka’s Social
Accountability School in 2008; new initiatives include report cards and
social audits (Im 2012).
Another example comes from the Commune Council Support Project, a
coalition from a number of prominent NGOs in Cambodia, which in 2004
designed a Citizens‘ Rating Report (CRR) to enhance the Social Account-
ability projects that are being undertaken in various rural regions of the
country to ’promote citizen monitoring of public service delivery‘ (CCSP
2010). The CRR aims to document and assess basic social services, budget
expenditures, administrative services, and infrastructure projects as a
method of observing and holding the state to account. In the long term
vision of its advocates there is a hope that it will contribute to the develop-
ment of a core ‘professional’ group of practitioners that at the commune
level can aid in the overall ideal of promoting greater levels of social
accountability (CCSP 2007: 47). The CRR attempts to create a neutral
mechanism that as a consequence can lead to a depoliticisation in the pro-
cess of feedback and collective response. Civil society actors are being
‘encouraged to create performance based mechanisms . . . and perfor-
mance-based evaluation systems under NPM. Citizens can participate in
quality monitoring and evaluation of delivered services, improving public
servants’ attention to rules and performance indicators in the future’ (Kim-
choeun et al. 2007: 29).
Cambodia’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) report in
2004 states that the continuing work of civil society is integral towards the
monitoring of poverty reduction and urges NGOs to help prepare report
cards in order to convey poverty concerns from the public. The IMF
believes that NGOs are the perfect candidates for this role in the current
climate, however, with more capacity building it will not be long before
more localised CSOs, such as farmers’ associations, will take on this moni-
toring role (IMF 2004: 113).
This idea links directly to the World Bank’s social accountability initia-
tive through empowering citizens to hold governments accountable for
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their actions, and actively monitor what governments are doing with aid.
Performance monitoring improves the level of transparency required to
undermine corruption, and requires a highly technical and professional
conception of civil society in order to undertake this role. The World
Bank’s From Shouting to Counting report reiterates this strategy through
the advice that citizens and civil society should act professionally and in a
neutral manner in order to create the collaborative institutions necessary
for an accountable liberal democracy. According to a 2004 USAID report:
CSOs should conserve the energy they often expend on confronta-
tion, and demand, in concert with donor partners, achievable but sig-
nificant short-term reforms from the RGC. By involving both
service-oriented and advocacy NGOs in the negotiating and monitor-
ing process, the donors will be planting the seeds for a grand alliance
designed to root out corruption at national, regional and commune
levels.
(USAID 2004: 14)
CBOs and local communities have raised concerns about the way in
which donors presume that Social Accountability mechanisms will take
root in the country; professional NGOs are attempting to introduce these
new tools and institutionalise external ideas without their consultation
(Chhim 2008). The repercussions are that active members of the commu-
nity joining CSOs to support various advocacy projects find themselves:
. . .engaged, more or less full time, in externally initiated, facilitated
and funded trainings, advocacy activities and consultations. . .. These
tendencies on the part of donors undermine the ability of community
activists networks to organize themselves, and prompt a process of
gradual but inexorable NGO-ization.
(Henke 2011: 306).
Henke’s research analyses the commodification of activism in Cambodia,
highlighting the creation of new contracts, salaries, and external funding
for NGO staff that can result in their ‘de-legitimation’ from activism to
professional NGO staff. As a former programme manager at the Inter-
church Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), he argues
that NGOs find it difficult to enact real ‘social change’ due to their depen-
dence on external donors, underwritten by bureaucratic accountability
structures that lock in dependency for funding (Henke 2008).
The DFGG project simply reinforces this critical dampening of civil soci-
ety by focusing on CSO commentary and judgement of programme effec-
tiveness rather than programme design. This has the effect of dampening
any form of assertive struggle over development issues; recent research
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carried out with CSO personnel that participated in the Silaka Social
Accountability Schools suggests that CSOs are increasingly sceptical on
pushing for further assertive engagement with the RGC over social
accountability (Rodan and Hughes 2012: 378). CSOs themselves are often
stuck in a difficult position vis-a-vis the RGC over social accountability;
the RGC still tends to view the donor priority of anti-corruption with scep-
ticism, and will actively intervene to disrupt CSOs that appear to be too
‘politically assertive’ in their monitoring of government performance
(Rodan and Hughes 2012: 378). The RGC has even been accused of using
its leverage over the $4million available from the DFGG project to work
explicitly with ‘constructive NGOs’ (Ngy cited in Rodan and Hughes 2012:
377).
Trade unions in Cambodia are subject to a similar level of ‘dissent damp-
ening’ through the de-politicising of critical spaces for dissent and their
replacement with technical/managerial structures. Hughes outlines how
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the RCG created a regu-
latory regime to monitor trade union–employer disputes, however, the out-
come was to quell the highly politicised urban labour sector (which had
previously been influential in mobilising demonstrations and protests)
through feeding grievances upwards along professional and technical chan-
nels (Hughes 2007: 844).
Conclusion
According to Hughes, the growing numbers of NGOs in Cambodia since
the 1990s embody a form of instrumentality in their approach to planning
projects and calculating budgets. This management approach is said to rep-
resent a preference for the professional over the political (Hughes 2003:
148). Viewed through a different lens, this discursive choice is actually
highly politicised through a particular neoliberal perspective. The neolib-
eral framing of the political dimension as neutral, technical and profes-
sional serves to marginalise alternative discourses from emerging and re-
capturing the debate (Mouffe 2000).
The increasing transformation of civil society into a technocratic model
to be deployed as a supporting mechanism for the efficient market and
accountable state under the new policy agenda has potentially very real
consequences for both the internal composition of CSOs, and their wider
societal impact in the country. This is not to suggest that all CSOs in Cam-
bodia are now technocratic entities divorced from their grassroots connec-
tions, or that new public management strategies will eradicate all forms of
reflexive thinking within these organisations, merely that this trend appears
to be increasing within the country, spurred on by a development ortho-
doxy that rewards precisely this form of professionalism as an integral cog
in the synergetic state/market/civil society nexus. Donor strategies of good
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governance reform of the Cambodian state have incorporated civil society
into two ideal types; efficient service providers and democratic watchdogs.
Service provision, as typified by the increased attention to microfinance,
requires an efficient CSO that is increasingly modelled on private sector
competitive models; while CSOs that participate in holding the state to
account, do so through a technical and neutral strategy of professionalism
that can help can implement ‘development alternatives’ rather than shap-
ing broader ‘alternatives to development’ (Bebbington et al. 2008). Both
roles reify a particular form of systemic rationality; economistic and admin-
istrative modes of coordination that prioritise efficiency, productivity, dis-
tribution, and evaluation. Societal dimensions of communicative
rationality are increasingly marginalised under the new policy agenda; civil
society’s potential reflexivity is reduced under a coordinated synergetic
model that promotes the sector as a tool to consolidate liberal market
democracy and fails to respect the diversity of civil society as a develop-
ment good in itself. Recent CSO initiatives in the country such as the ‘Siem
Reap consensus’ have drawn global civil society groups together to pro-
mote the importance of CSOs as development actors in their own right,
including recognising the importance of diversity and local context from
these organisations (and thus to distance CSOs from technical implementa-
tion mechanisms). Although an important and ambitious proposal, much of
the language is concerned with the restriction of spaces for civil society due
to authoritarian legislation and regulation. One of the key concerns is the
way in which the RGC is pressing ahead with a controversial Law on Asso-
ciations and NGOs (LANGO) aiming to regulate the registration of
NGOs in the country. Concerns raised from the NGO community include
the way in which the RGC would be able to arbitrarily close NGOs or
block their registration. This has the potential to ‘severely hamper both
their projects and their advocacy efforts to promote good governance and
development approaches that respect human rights’ (Human Rights Watch
2011).
This is clearly important for the actual functioning of CSOs, however,
prioritising the organisational independence of civil society from the state
and the market, still neglects the core problems outlined in this article;
namely the permeation of state/market (administrative/economistic)
coordination mechanisms into civil society under good governance
frameworks.
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Notes
1. Edwards and Hulme argue that of the two roles for civil society under the New
Policy Agenda, it is (political) democratic oversight that is linked to good gover-
nance reform, however, I argue in this article that both the political and eco-
nomic dimensions can be conceptualised as part of the good governance
framework, due to a new focus on professionalism and efficiency within the gov-
ernance of NGO-based (economic) service provision (Edwards and Hulme
1996a)
2. Cambodia is sometimes referred to as a ‘hybrid democracy’ containing the for-
mal institutions of a liberal democratic state but failing to comply to the norms
values and procedures of a democracy (Kim and Ojendal 2009: 102).
3. Habermas outlined three key modes of social coordination; communicative,
administrative and economic, the first tends to be linked to the reflexive coordi-
nation mechanisms associated with civil society, whilst the latter two modes are
linked to a particular instrumental form of rationality that is associated with sys-
tems of governance (Habermas 1994).
4. Although the umbrella term CSO is increasingly common, many donor institu-
tions such as the World Bank will differentiate between non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and community building organisations (CBOs). NGOs
are often seen as serving a wider variety of individuals, with generally a more
formal structure, while CBOs are less formally organised and tied directly to the
community from which they emerge (Gibbs et al; 1999).
5. Prior to the Paris Peace Accords, the Cambodian people had endured one of the
most ruthlessly brutal political systems in modern history under the Khmer
Rouge (1975–79) leading to the eventual intervention by Vietnamese forces to
establish the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–91).
6. The usage of the term donor community within Cambodia represents the bilat-
eral donors: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Rus-
sia, Thailand, UK, and the US, as well as the multilateral institutions of the
World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and a variety of UN agen-
cies. These external development partners make up the influential ‘Consultative
Group’ (CG) and the Government Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) to
harmonise and improve aid strategy between the government and donors.
7. Although this is generally attributed to a particular donor perspective of the
country, the government also recognised that this period represents ‘starting
from ground zero’ (RGC 2006).
8. Interestingly, the original NGO-GPP acronym stood for NGO Good Practice
Project up until 2011; its transition serves to reinforce the argument about an
increasingly professional interpretation of accountability mechanisms.
9. In particular, the RGC in its updated 2008 Rectangular Strategy and NSDP
2009–2013 emphasises the importance of working with those NGOs and associa-
tions that operate according to the principles of Good Governance (RGC 2011).
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